President George W. Bush’s Military Service: A Critical Analysis

 

 

© 2004

Gerald A. Lechliter
E-mail: Glechliter AT aol DOT com


 

Table of Contents

 

I. Summary. 1

 

II.Introduction. 1

 

III.Enlsitment and Attendance at Required Training in Texas Air National Guard (“TXANG”). 2

 

A. Regulatory Requirements for Attendance at Required Training. 2

 

B. Bush’s Enlistment and Attendance at Required Training. 8

 

IV. Flight Status. 18

 

V. Bush’s Performance as Documented on AF Form  77, “Officer Effectiveness/Training Report” (F77). 20

 

VI. Discharge from TXANG and Assignment to ARPC. 22

 

A. Regulatory Requirements. 22

 

B. Bush’s Records. 25

 

VII. Pay Records. 28

 

VIII. Altering Official Records. 30

 

IX. Standards for Evaluating Bush’s Performance. 31

 

X. Conclusion. 32

 

 


I.                   Summary.

 

The following analysis of President Bush’s (“Bush”) military records and the controlling legal authorities shows the following beyond any reasonable doubt:

v      The pay records released by the White House this past winter prove Bush received unauthorized, i.e., fraudulent, payments for inactive duty training, even if he did show up for duty.

v      The memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Albert C. Lloyd, who affirmed for the White House that Bush met his retention/retirement year point requirement, is an obfuscation, or outright deception, that disregarded Bush’s failure to meet the statutory and regulatory fiscal year satisfactory participation requirement.

v      Bush’s superiors in the Texas Air National Guard failed to take required regulatory actions when Bushed missed required training and failed to take his flight physical.

v      Despite seemingly laudatory comments, Bush’s May 1972 officer performance report was a clear and unmistakable indication that his performance had declined from the annual 1971 report.  The report was the kiss of death before he left for Alabama that year.

v      Bush did not meet the requirements for satisfactory participation from 1972 to 1973.

II.                 Introduction.

 

By way of background, I am a retired (1999) Army colonel with active Marine enlisted service (1967-69). I have been a registered Independent my entire political life and truthfully can say I have voted for members of both the Republican and Democratic Parties at the local, state, and national levels.

Stories in 2000 on the Internet about Bush’s military record piqued my interest.  I requested and received a copy of his records from the Headquarters, Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), and Department of Army and Air Force Air National Guard (ANG) Bureau (Bureau) in 2000 right after the election. The Bureau provided all the substantive records that, incidentally, coincided with the documents available on the Internet.

This analysis concluded that Bush failed to fulfill faithfully and fully the solemn obligation he accepted when he enlisted in the Texas ANG (TXANG) in 1968.  The nature of his service is an important issue in this 2004 presidential election because it received scant coverage in 2000 and because it strikes at the heart of Bush’s credibility. 

In 2000, Bush ran on bringing back “dignity and honor to the White House (WH)” and being a “compassionate conservative.”  Since 9-11, he has wrapped himself in the flag to push forward a domestic agenda that is anything but compassionate and well to the right of center; embarked on a perilous new national security strategy of “preemptive war” and invaded Iraq; and even has used the uniform to garner political support, the first for a President in my lifetime, although there have been others who had more illustrious military service. Bush himself brought on the renewed scrutiny of his military record by stressing his role as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces, declaring himself a “wartime president,” and using the word “war” more than 30 times in the course of an interview on “Meet the Press” that lasted less than an hour.

This analysis of Bush’s military service is based on the documents in the FOIA response, contemporaneous regulations, selected media information, and the documents more recently released by the White House (WH) found at the USA Today (“USAT”) and Fact Check websites.[1] The source of the WH-released documents, however, is not known, and there are different repositories, including ARPC, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the Office of the Texas Adjutant General, and the National Personnel Records Center (Military Personnel Records).

III.               Enlistment and Attendance at Required Training in Texas Air National Guard (“TXANG”).

A.      Regulatory Requirements for Attendance at Required Training.

Air Force Manual (“AFM”) 35-3, “Air Reserve Forces Personnel Administration,” dated June 25, 1969 (“AFM 35-3”), with its periodic amendments was the primary controlling authority available for this analysis.[2]  “Satisfactory Participation” was defined as “the manner in which a member meets the training requirements of his reserve assignment.”  Training consisted of Annual Active Duty for Training (“ANACDUTRA”) and Inactive Duty for Training (“INACDUTRA”).[3]


A member of the ANGUS could earn points by performing ANACDUTRA and INACDUTRA.  ANACDUTRA required orders, placing the member on AD.[4]  INACDUTRA had to be supervised and “authorized in advance by competent authority.”[5] “INACDUTRA must be authorized in advance by an AF Form 40 or 40a or other means specified in this section.  Use AF Form 40 when more than one person participates in the training session; use AF Form 40a when only one person participates. Use AF From [sic] 40 or 40a to authorize UTAs [Unit Training Assemblies], TPs [Training Periods], APDY [Appropriate Duty], and EQT [Equivalent Training]. . . .”[6]  Satisfactory participation, therefore, involved regular attendance at prescribed INACDUTRA by a member unless he was properly excused.

In the type of unit[7] in which Bush served, regular attendance entailed not having more than four absences in a fiscal year (“FY”) that ran from July 1 through June 30 at that time. It meant reporting to the appointed place at the designated time.[8] There were the following types of training within INACDUTRA:

1)    TP: An authorized period of training, duty, or instruction performed by members as individuals.

2)    UTA: An authorized and scheduled period of training, duty, or instruction, including test alerts by units.

a)    APDY: Duty which unit members perform instead of attending a scheduled UTA when absence is from cause beyond their control, such as illness or other personal hardship.

b)    EQT: Duty that may be authorized for unit members unable to attend a UTA scheduled while they are on AD in support of the active force.

3)    Additional Flying Training Period (“AFTP”): An authorized additional period of flying training.[9]

Only an APDY or EQT, therefore, could be used to make up a missed UTA.

There also were time limits for making up excused absences, and absences because of “illness, personal hardship or other circumstances beyond [] control,” from a scheduled UTA: A “member must perform the periods of APDY or EQT within 15 days immediately before or 30 days immediately after the regularly scheduled UTA but before the next month’s first scheduled UTA (whichever is earlier) and within the same fiscal year.”[10]

Members of the ANG were required to attend 48 INACDUTRA periods per year and complete not less than 15 days ANACDUTRA to achieve the “satisfactory participation” standard.[11]  A member in Bush’s category could not have more than four absences from INACDUTRA in a fiscal year; attendance alone, however, was not sufficient, and a member had to assume “responsibilities commensurate with his grade” and had to perform “his assigned duties in a satisfactory manner as determined by the unit commander.”[12]